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Abstract 
As the arsenal of weapons managed by the Department of Defense (DoD) ages, 
the country’s leadership is forced to make decisions regarding what to do with current 
and projected funding to maintain military defensive and offensive capabilities.  One 
important piece of this decision is the operations and sustainment (O&S) cost for the 
system.  The acquisition community at many levels has stated that O&S costs are about 
70 percent of the total life-cycle costs of the average system, the other 30 percent being 
spent in the acquisition phase.  This “golden ratio” appears to come from estimates 
created during the acquisition phase of a weapon system's life cycle.  Although some 
programs may have used (or attempted to use) some actual data, whether from antecedent 
systems or preliminary testing data, as a basis for their estimates, there has been little 
research into the actual ratio of O&S-to-acquisition costs.  
This research has found a significant departure from the “golden ratio” in 
currently fielded systems.  Using 37 Air Force, Navy, and Joint programs, the average 
program was estimated to realize closer to 55 percent of its costs in the O&S phase, 
though this figure does not come close to telling the whole story.  Significant deviances, 
both high and low, from this 55 percent average were seen in most of the weapon system 
categories analyzed due to many factors, such as life expectancy, acquisition strategy, 
and level of annual sustainment costs for each category.  Due to these significant 
differences, using a single ratio to describe the cost envelope of the “average” weapon 
system is not recommended.   
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1 
Investigation into the Ratio of System Operations and Support Costs to Life-Cycle 
Costs for Department of Defense Weapon Systems 
I.  Introduction 
Background 
Operations and support (O&S) costs have long been overlooked in the 
acquisitions community and at higher levels in the Department of Defense (DoD).  As 
evidenced in the overabundance of studies into acquisition costs and much smaller body 
of work in O&S costs, more focus seems to be placed on the beginning of the life cycle 
of a DoD weapon system (acquisition) and tend to neglect the other significant portion of 
the weapon system’s life cycle (sustainment).  Though this portion of the weapon system 
must be included in many cost analyses for Major Defense Acquisition Programs 
(MDAPs), there is more emphasis on trying to discern the cost of developing and 
procuring a system than in how the system will be sustained and how long the system 
will be operating.  This matter is complicated further by the difficulty in determining the 
true life cycle of a weapon system.  Some systems, such as automated information 
systems (AIS), may see a short life cycle due to the ever-changing information security 
and cryptologic standards and concerns of the DoD.  Other systems, such as the B-52, 
have proven themselves to be so useful and versatile, not to mention costly or 
burdensome to replace, that they have been extended far beyond their expected life.   
General Issue 
Although the DoD has not historically given the O&S side of weapon system 
costs enough attention, they are not without resources to help cost analysts and program 
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managers develop at least a rough estimate of what those costs should be.  From all levels 
of acquisition leadership, managers and analysts are taught that there is a certain ratio of 
costs attributable to each of the stages in a weapon system’s life, generally 30% towards 
acquisition and 70% for O&S (Carter, 2011).  Everyone in the defense acquisitions 
industry has most likely been indoctrinated with a chart similar to the one in Figure 1 
(OSD CAIG, 1992) showing increasing costs going from research and development 
through procurement, leading to a significant jump in funding in the O&S phase and a 
relatively insignificant disposal cost.  This is touted as the standard cost profile under 
which most programs operate. Notable exceptions to this profile are satellite systems that 
require relatively minimal O&S costs once the system is in orbit.   
Many studies by the Government Accountability Office (US GAO, 2000; 2010; 
2012) have cited this same ratio or used similar graphics as part of the Background 
section in Congressional reports, illustrating how ingrained these two acquisition “facts” 
are in the culture.  If this “golden ratio” is correct, then we should be able to predict O&S 
costs for a weapon system somewhat reliably based on its acquisition cost.   
One important question remains unanswered: Where did this golden ratio 
originate?  In many cases, documents state that “historical” or “generally-accepted 
knowledge” is the source of the information, if any source is referenced at all.  Some 
reports give different ratios depending on weapon system types.   For instance, the 
Institute for Defense Analyses prepared a report in 1999 that showed non-space programs 
estimated their O&S costs ranging from 33% for rotary-wing aircraft to 70% for AIS 
(IDA, 1999).   
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Figure 1: Notional Life-Cycle Costs for a DoD Weapon System (OSD CAIG, 1992) 
 
Although some studies have looked into O&S costs, they are usually specific to a 
weapon system or group of similar systems and typically only look at the estimates of 
O&S in the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP).  Very little research has been 
performed using actual O&S costs of weapon systems to determine how this phase in the 
life cycle compares to the life cycle as a whole.  Part of the problem of performing this 
kind of analysis is the difficulty in obtaining actual system-specific cost data with good 
fidelity for the duration of the O&S phase.  In almost all cases, data is either incomplete 
or does not exist.    
Research Questions 
The primary focus of this thesis is to identify the original source of the widely-
accepted 70% O&S cost figure and attempt to validate the methodology that gave rise to 
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it or develop a model that more closely represents reality.  Specifically, the following 
questions will be explored: 
Is there an identifiable source for the “golden ratio”?  Identifying the original 
source of this information should give insight into the intent and methodology behind the 
ratio and should help dispel false information added through oral tradition.   Spreading 
information by word-of-mouth is both dangerous and effective: dangerous because it may 
not be able to be traced to its source and information tends to stray from the original 
facts, and effective because information, whether true or false, can spread very quickly, 
especially in command or educational environments.  
If a source can be found, are the source and/or methodology credible?  Many 
factors need to be considered when analyzing data, especially in the DoD.  Across the 
services, a wide variety of weapon system types are available for analysis.  A look 
through the history of acquisition data available for MDAPs yields incomplete data and 
ever-changing program reporting trends.  These changes and data holes need to be 
correctly accounted for in order for a methodology to be credible. 
If a source is found and was valid at some point, is the information still valid? 
The information from any relevant study can be evaluated with current tools and updated 
with current information on the systems that were initially analyzed, if any.  As time 
progresses, so does technology.  Systems designed to operate in a combat environment 30 
years ago are undoubtedly less complex and less costly to develop and possibly maintain.  
This disparity in complexity could lead to a shift in costs, or costs in both the acquisition 
and O&S phases could have risen proportionally equally, leaving previous ratios intact. 
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Can a more accurate model be developed?  As previously discussed, an obvious 
exception to the 70% rule of thumb is in space systems.  It follows that other systems 
would stray from this percentage, as well.  The B-52, for example, entered service in 
1955 and has the possibility of being used beyond 2040 (B-52 Stratofortress, 2011), 
potentially pushing sustainment costs for the system above 70% of life-cycle costs.  We 
may be able to introduce more realistic ratios that are dependent on type of weapon 
system, lead DoD service (Air Force, Navy), or some combination of these or other 
factors. 
Methodology 
The database used for this paper is the one assembled in the dissertation Cost-
Based Decision Model for Valuing System Design Options (Ryan, 2012).  A complete 
description of the methods used to derive the operations and support costs for the specific 
systems used are given in this dissertation.  Acquisition data were derived from the 
Selected Acquisition Reports (SARs) available through the Defense Acquisition 
Management Information Retrieval (DAMIR) system.  Although the SAR has been the 
subject of criticism by some due to the lack of consistency throughout time and from 
program to program (and sometimes within a program) (Hough, 1992), it is the most 
thorough and readily available data on any type of acquisition program in the DoD.  
Since we are limited to SAR data, we are also limited to programs designated as 
Acquisition Category I (ACAT I) or Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs).  
These are programs that exceed $365 million (BY2000) in Research, Development, Test, 
& Evaluation (RDT&E) funding or $2.19 billion (BY2000) in Procurement funding, or 
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have been designated by Congress or the DoD as an ACAT I program due to high 
visibility or interest.   
Operations and support (O&S) actual cost information was retrieved from the 
Naval Visibility and Management of Operating and Support Costs (VAMOSC) system 
for the Navy and the Air Force Total Operations Cost (AFTOC) system for the Air Force.  
Due to concerns about the fidelity of the data from the Army’s Operating and Support 
Management Information System (OSMIS), O&S data from this system was not used.  
O&S costs attributable to personnel, contractor logistics, fuel, and software, among other 
areas, were deficient or missing for entire weapon systems in OSMIS, without any 
reasonable method of obtaining these costs and attributing them to the correct program 
(Ryan, 2012).   
To identify the programs to be analyzed in the dissertation, two major criteria 
were applied to the available SARs in DAMIR.1  First, the programs needed to have a 
valid O&S estimate.  Even though the analysis in this thesis did not require this limitation 
and reduced the number of systems available for analysis, this criterion was retained to 
reduce the amount of error, specifically, the error due to the collection of data and 
miscalculation of the Annual Unitized Cost (AUC), described later.  Although all 
                                                 
 
 
 
1 For a more complete description of the methodology used to create the database, read “A 
Proposed Methodology to Characterize the Accuracy of Life-Cycle Cost Estimates for DoD Programs” 
(Ryan, Jacques, Colombi, & Schubert, 2012) 
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programs are required to consider O&S costs, many MDAPs do not include an O&S cost 
estimate in the SAR until later in the program.   
Second, the program needed to have stable operations costs.  Newly fielded 
systems tend to have periods of ramp-up where the full capability has not been fielded 
and true annual costs are not known.  The final database included 37 programs – seven 
from the Air Force, 24 from the Navy and six joint programs2,3 - with operational data 
from 1989 through 2010.  These programs came from eight different categories: Missiles, 
Cargo/Tanker/Bomber Aircraft, Fighter Aircraft, Rotary-Wing Aircraft, Ships, Electronic 
Equipment, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, and Tilt-Rotor Aircraft.  These categories were 
determined based on the categories given for life expectancies in the 2007 Operating and 
Support Cost Estimating Guide published by the Office of the Secretary of Defense Cost 
Assessment and Program Evaluation (OSD CAPE).4 
One of the metrics calculated from the information in the VAMOSC and AFTOC 
systems was an actual Annual Unitized O&S Cost (AUC) per program.  This metric 
generally describes the cost to operate and sustain one unit (individual plane, ship, etc.) 
                                                 
 
 
 
2 One program from the original database could not be used due to the nature of the program.  
Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) involved purchasing a launch capability and not necessarily 
specific units that could be assigned an annual cost.   
3 The AIM-9X, Advanced Medium Range Air-To-Air Missile (AMRAAM), Joint Air-to-Surface 
Standoff Missile (JASSM), Joint Primary Aircraft Training System (JPATS), and the Joint Standoff 
Weapon (JSOW) are the joint programs used by the Air Force and Navy.  The Joint Surveillance Target 
Attack Radar System (JSTARS) is a joint program between the Air Force and Army. 
4 The UAV and Tilt-Rotor classes are relatively new classes of systems that were not mentioned in 
this guide.  They were listed as their own class due to the unique capabilities of these systems. 
 
8 
per year.  Using the AUC facilitated the approximation the life-cycle costs of a program 
by multiplying the AUC by the number of units procured and the life expectancy.  Using 
the simple ratio of O&S costs to LCC, we were able to determine more probable cost 
ratios for different systems using life expectancies from the SARs for each program and 
the O&S cost estimating guide published by OSD CAPE (OSD CAPE, 2012).  Simple 
descriptive statistics were then used to determine the basic characteristics of each set of 
data according to the weapon system type and service. 
Assumptions/Limitations 
Since we are using data from two different O&S cost systems, we are assuming 
the data was entered into the system using similar categories or in such a way that any 
significant discrepancies can be corrected to obtain similar life-cycle data among 
programs and services.  By using the AUC, we are assuming the unitized cost is the 
annual average cost from fielding through disposal.  This assumption is known to be false 
since the first years of fielding will have ramp-up costs and limited fielding (generally 
costing less per year than an average year) and the last few years will have costs 
associated with disposal or demilitarization.  Disposal and demilitarization costs are not 
specifically addressed and are beyond the scope of this analysis.   
We were limited by the information contained in the SARs and O&S cost 
systems.  SARs have been known to have discrepancies or to be incomplete (Hough, 
1992; Drezner, et al., 1993; Jarvaise, et al., 1996; US GAO, 2012).  The AFTOC and 
Naval VAMOSC systems are dynamic systems that change as regulations are enacted and 
policies change, allowing the possibility of costs being allocated differently through the 
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years.  Anecdotal evidence also suggests O&S costs are not properly attributed to the 
correct units as a common practice.  For example, in the Air Force there are stories about 
“hangar queens,” aircraft that have been cannibalized to repair other aircraft.  While one 
aircraft was waiting for funding for a single repair, maintenance crews used other parts 
from this aircraft to fix the systems on other aircraft.  This artificially lowers the 
sustainment costs for the other aircraft while dramatically increasing the cost of the first 
aircraft.  This highlights a problem in using these systems – some costs have not been 
entered correctly into the system, whether by oversight, ignorance, or procedure.  By 
using Naval VAMOSC and AFTOC, we are accepting this risk and assume any 
discrepancies will not substantially degrade the fidelity of our results. 
The data in either O&S cost system reflects a snapshot in time.  The data retrieved 
from VAMOSC or AFTOC does not necessarily represent the normal operating expenses 
under typical conditions.  For example, in 2011, the Air Force grounded the entire fleet of 
F-22s due to pilot-oxygen issues.  Also, the United States has been engaged in wartime 
activities for more than a decade and is preparing to draw down forces in Afghanistan by 
2014.  Although the data collected for this research did not include operations data past 
2010, these circumstances illustrate some of the many unplanned situations that can occur 
in the life cycle of a weapon system.  These types of perturbations in cost would be 
evened out over longer periods of time, but for newly-fielded systems, these types of 
changes will significantly impact metrics like the AUC. 
Both of the O&S cost systems have limited availability of data.  Although much 
information can be obtained through these systems, they are limited in that they capture 
costs for systems that were operational while VAMOSC or AFTOC were online.  In the 
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2011 SAR for the F/A-18E/F, the program office reported it could not include antecedent 
O&S costs since “[t]he cost data for platforms in existence prior to 1997 is either 
unavailable or incomplete” (US Navy, 2011).  These retired systems would be a valuable 
source of cost information since they not only would be able to provide a true life-cycle 
cost picture, but would also give insight into the actual life expectancy of a weapon 
system.  All of the work in this paper uses actual sustainment data combined with 
estimates of life expectancies of DoD weapon systems.  A review of actual life cycle 
durations and costs of retired DoD weapon systems is beyond the scope of this paper and 
may be impossible for many systems due to the lack of available information regarding 
their O&S costs. 
Implications 
Many professionals at all levels in the defense acquisitions industry are told that 
the O&S portion of a weapon system’s life-cycle costs will be around 70 percent.  If the 
relative proportion of O&S costs is truly 70 percent (or greater), then those people in the 
acquisition community need to stress the importance of doing whatever is necessary in 
the acquisition phase to reduce costs in the O&S phase.  If this is not true, then our focus 
should be on the other aspects of a weapon system that are driving costs higher 
throughout the life cycle of the system. 
If O&S costs can rightfully be reduced to a simple function of their acquisition 
costs, then an accurate estimate of the acquisition cost should be able to give a rough 
estimate of the O&S costs, thereby giving decision makers another tool for determining 
affordability or performing portfolio analyses.  Even if the ratios need to change by 
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service, weapon system type, length of expected life cycle, or some other metric, this 
research will be able to provide greater insight into the true costs of supporting our 
weapon systems. 
Preview 
In Chapter 2, we review the current literature that has contributed to this research.  
Chapter 3 provides the methodology used to research the topic and analyze the findings. 
Chapter 4 is a discussion of the analysis and results.  Chapter 5 is a summary and review 
of the implications of this research. 
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II.  Literature Review 
Chapter Overview 
This chapter reviews the effort made to trace the source of the “golden ratio” of 
acquisition to operations and support costs.   We review some terms to ensure a common 
understanding of the terms as they will be used in this review and continue with a 
chronological history of cost ratios in DoD literature. 
Description  
First, we define what is meant by “operations and support costs.”   According to 
the Office of the Secretary of Defense Cost Analysis Improvement Group (OSD CAIG) 
Operating and Support Cost-Estimating Guide from October 2007, a system’s O&S cost: 
 
“Consists of sustainment costs incurred from the initial system deployment 
through the end of system operations. Includes all costs of operating, maintaining, 
and supporting a fielded system. Specifically, this consists of the costs (organic 
and contractor) of personnel, equipment, supplies, software, and services 
associated with operating, modifying, maintaining, supplying, training, and 
supporting a system in the DoD inventory” (OSD CAIG, 2007). 
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This definition allows for some costs that are outside of the Operations and 
Maintenance (O&M)5 appropriation to be used as support costs.  Some examples of this 
would include structures paid for with military construction funding, procurement 
funding for software patches, and the cost of specific military and civilian personnel 
assigned to a weapon system funded through the military personnel and civilian pay 
appropriations, respectively.  Some studies further define what O&S means to their 
particular area of focus, but this definition has generally held true throughout recent 
government acquisition history.  Disposal costs are not discussed in detail in many 
sources but have been lumped together with the O&S costs in some reports and studies 
(OSD CAIG, 1992; US GAO, 2000). 
Two other terms in the DoD vocabulary need to be addressed: life-cycle costs and 
total ownership costs.  These terms, though similar, are separate concepts that encompass 
different realms of the defense environment.  The Defense Acquisition Guidebook 
(DAG) defines life-cycle costs in the following manner: 
 
“For a defense acquisition program, life-cycle cost consists of research and 
development costs, investment costs, operating and support costs, and disposal 
                                                 
 
 
 
5 The Operations and Maintenance (O&M) appropriations for each DoD service should not be 
confused with O&S costs.  Some O&M costs (such as Fuel) are attributable to specific weapon systems and 
their sustainment costs, while other O&M costs (such as base utility costs) are not included in the O&S 
costs for any particular weapon system. 
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costs over the entire life cycle. These costs include not only the direct costs of the 
acquisition program but also indirect costs that would be logically attributed to the 
program. In this way, all costs that are logically attributed to the program are 
included, regardless of funding source or management control” (DAU, 2012). 
 
Total ownership costs a little more broad in scope.  The DAG defines this to 
include “the elements of a program's life-cycle cost as well as other related infrastructure 
or business processes costs not necessarily attributed to the program in the context of the 
defense acquisition system” (DAU, 2012).  These costs are not typically seen in 
acquisition O&S estimates, since they are usually accounted for in other budgetary 
realms.  These other costs generally pertain to other infrastructure costs, such as the 
support to the equipment used for acquisition activities, support to military personnel 
(administration, medical care, etc.), and base communications infrastructure.  These costs 
would be included in other types of cost estimates, such as a business case analysis for 
reengineering a process or operation, and is well beyond the scope of this paper. 
When dealing with the life of a weapon system, we discuss its service life and its 
life expectancy.  According to the DAU glossary online, the service life describes the 
period of time “from first inception of the weapon until final phaseout” (DAU, 2012).   
Realistically, some costs incurred in the very early stages of a program, such as those 
before Milestone A, may not be fully captured due to the immaturity of the technology or 
divergence from some original concept.  According to the 1992 and 2007 versions of the 
CAIG (CAPE) O&S Guides, life expectancy should include the phase-in period, a period 
of steady-state operations, and a phase-out or decommissioning period (OSD CAIG, 
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1992; 2007).  The draft version of the 2012 CAPE Guide we reviewed wasn’t as clear, 
though it stated that “[t]he O&S estimate should extend over the full life expectancy of 
the system,” alluding to the idea that life expectancy only pertains to the O&S phase.  
This distinction is important since, as will be shown in the following review, these terms 
appear to be used interchangeably even though they are clearly defined to be different in 
scope.   
One last distinction to be made is that between Base Year (BY) and Then Year 
(TY).  In performing financial analyses that span many years, the effects of inflation need 
to be understood in order to be able to directly compare events that happened in different 
periods of time.  For example, the price of a loaf of bread 50 years ago is less than the 
price of the same loaf of bread today.  The Base Year (BY, or Constant Year) describes 
past and future costs as they would appear in a certain year of reference.  Then Year (TY, 
or Current Year) describes costs as they would appear when costs are incurred or when 
purchases are made, usually taking into account the effects of inflation or other factors 
over time.  For example, if a military unit estimates it will use $1,000 this year in 
administrative costs and they do not expect the cost to change per year, the BY2013 cost 
will be $1,000 per year for as many years as the estimate covers.  To calculate the TY 
costs, the military unit needs to escalate the annual cost using some factor to account for 
the general rise in prices over time.  According to the 2012 SAF/FMCEE inflation 
calculator, the administrative cost for this illustrative budget would be estimated to be 
about $1011 in 2013, $1,029 in 2014, $1,047 in 2015, and $1,066 in 2016.  The BY 
estimate for 2013 – 2016 in this example is $4,000, with a TY estimate of $4,153.  Over 
small amounts of time, the effects of this difference between BY and TY may be 
 
16 
somewhat insignificant, but over the life of a 30-year program where budgets are 
measured in the millions or billions of dollars, this difference is significant.   
All SARs provide an estimate of costs based on the year in which the program 
was initiated or achieved a certain major event, such as a Milestone or major rebaselining 
of the program due to a significant cost or schedule breach, as well as provide an estimate 
that has been escalated for inflation.  Except where noted, the discussion as to whether an 
analysis was conducted under BY or TY assumptions was never broached.  Discussions 
with those in the cost analysis community have revealed that when presenting costs for 
comparison, an analyst will typically use a BY estimate.  In this research, we assume that 
the BY is the framework for analysis in the literature reviewed, unless it is specifically 
noted. 
Relevant Research 
The earliest documented mention of operations costs of military operations 
appears to be in Sun Tzu’s The Art of War (Tzu, Sixth century B.C.).  In his second 
chapter on waging war, Sun Tzu writes, “government expenditures, those due to broken-
down chariots, worn-out horses, armor and helmets, arrows and crossbows, lances, hand 
and body shields, draft animals and supply wagons will amount to four-tenths of its total 
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revenue.”6  This may sound like the information we are seeking but it should be sidelined 
as merely an interesting quote due to the significant differences in the development 
efforts and logistical planning between the weapon systems of sixth-century China and 
today. 
The earliest modern report we found to tackle the subject of O&S cost ratios was 
a report on life-cycle costing written in 1975 by Marco Fiorello of the Rand Corporation 
(Fiorello, 1975).  Figure 2 is one rough approximation of the life-cycle cost of a DoD 
weapon system.  The dotted lines show the period of time in which costs for a certain 
period in the life cycle are affected by decisions made by the program managers and 
other influential participants.  The solid lines show when costs are incurred for that 
particular phase.  The author stated that for the costs of ownership, “…these costs in 
general make up over 50 percent of the LCC of aircraft weapon systems” (pg. 5).  There 
are no further citations showing how this figure was derived, though some of his 
methodology is included further along in an example given in the paper.  The author 
assumes a 15-year operational period for his aircraft case example with a 5% discount 
rate, all adjusted for inflation to BY73.  This example was provided by the author to 
illustrate the basic ideas of weapon system costs before going further into his discussion, 
                                                 
 
 
 
6 This quote appears to have been translated to read “60 percent” instead of “four-tenths” in at 
least one translation since it has been cited to read this way in a few documents, such as the third edition of 
the Defense Systems Management College Acquisition Guide. (Defense Systems Management College, 
1997)  Most translations we reviewed, however, stated “four-tenths”.   
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but it bears noting what his underlying assumptions were as they give insight into the 
state of cost estimating at the time of publication. 
 
 
Figure 2: Weapon System Life-Cycle Stages and Costs (Fiorello, 1975) 
 
Another report of note in the same year was published by the Army Electronics 
Command regarding the Tactical Radio Communication System (TRCS) (Otto, Jr., 
1975).  Although this report was not specifically concerned with the relative cost of 
supporting the fielded system, it does provide a life-cycle cost estimate (LCCE) of the 
system.  The results are summarized in Table 1.  This estimate assumes a 15-year life 
expectancy and is in BY75 dollars.  The immediate difference between this data and the 
data that will be used for the rest of this thesis is the size of the program: even with 
inflation figured into the totals, the TRCS is not a Major Defense Acquisition Program 
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(MDAP).  The implication of this is not immediately clear, but it does bear mentioning 
since MDAPs may behave significantly differently from smaller programs.   
 
Table 1:  LCCE for TRCS (Otto, Jr., 1975) 
 $ BY1975 Percent of Total 
R&D $      24,870,000
6.71% 
R&D Other $           290,000
Procurement - Recurring $    235,911,133
67.36% 
Procurement – R, Other $      16,810,000
Procurement – Non-Recurring $        2,650,000
1.52% 
Procurement – NR, Other $        3,050,000
O&M $      91,606,886 24.42% 
 
In October 1977, a report in two parts was given to the US Senate Committee on 
Appropriations by the Comptroller General of the United States on the O&S costs of new 
systems compared to the systems they are replacing (US GAO, 1977).  In Part 2 
Appendix IV of this report, we find Table 2, which was the most recent cost estimate for 
a fleet of 800 F-18s as of October 1976 in FY1975 dollars.  The information in Table 2 
was based on an estimate that used the actual performance and logistics of the F-14 as an 
analogy to the F-18 and used an estimated life expectancy of 15 years.  As of October 
2012, the F/A-18 aircraft is still in operation and recently went through a major upgrade 
with the E/F variants.  (US Navy, 2011)  The Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) for 
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2011 for the F/A-18E/F shows a 20-year life expectancy was used for the estimate of 
O&S costs.   
Table 2:  Summary of Life-Cycle Cost Estimate for 800 F-18s (US GAO, 1977) 
 Millions Percent 
Operating and Support $   5,809.3      42.2% 
Production $   6,524.1      47.4% 
Full-scale development $   1,429.3      10.4% 
Total $  13,762.7      100% 
 
This example illustrates a few of the difficulties in identifying O&S costs for a 
weapon system.  First, the life expectancy has changed.  Better materials and 
technologies can extend the life expectancy of a weapon system.  This life expectancy 
may change again in the future.  Second, the F/A-18 is going through an evolutionary 
acquisition and has already lived through variants A through D.  Are each of these 
variants considered part of the same program or completely different programs?  For each 
iteration of this airframe, two versions of essentially the same aircraft are produced. The 
most visible difference between variants E and F (as well as between variants A and B 
and variants C and D) is that the former has a single-seat configuration and the latter has 
a two-seat configuration primarily for training.  The two variants are developed and 
produced in tandem and considered the same program.  Some additions to the E/F 
variants include airborne Forward Air Controller enhancements and the ability to act as a 
tanker aircraft for refueling other aircraft.  Even though the new variants don’t look much 
different externally, the amount of funding that went into the development ($5.9B 
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BY2000) and procurement ($40.7B BY2000) of the new variants was enough to classify 
the E/F variant program as its own MDAP.  The use of variants can be seen throughout 
the DoD with varying levels and strategies of development, modernization, and 
replacement of older variations.  Identifying a valid ratio for any system with variants, 
whether the variants were originally planned or unplanned, may prove more complicated.  
The AH-1 Cobra and Bradley M2/M3 Fighting Vehicles weapon systems illustrate this 
difficulty well. 
In 1981, the US Comptroller General delivered a report to Congress on logistics 
planning for the M1 tank. (US GAO, 1981)  The report was aimed at convincing 
Congress that more funding should be spent on research and development and initial 
procurement to reduce the O&S costs, arguing “the costs of operating and supporting a 
system, such as the M1, may be 70 to 90 percent of the system’s life-cycle cost” (pg.18).  
No further citation is given as the source of this information. 
With the release of the Operating and Support Cost-Estimating Guide by the OSD 
CAIG in 1992, more official guidance was given regarding O&S cost estimates (OSD 
CAIG, 1992).  This guide does not designate any particular ratio of O&S costs to 
acquisition costs, but does give an example of how costs vary from program to program.  
It states, “To show how the cost distribution can vary from one program to the next, 
[Table 3] provides a breakout of the costs incurred during the key acquisition phases for 
two different weapon systems.” (Section 2.2)  No further methodology into the 
information in the table was provided. 
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Table 3:  Percentage of Life-Cycle Costs Incurred in Various Program Phases (OSD CAIG, 1992) 
 R&D Investment O&S 
F-16 Fighter 2% 20% 78% 
M-2 Bradley Fighting Vehicle 2% 14% 84% 
 
Immediately prior to this table is the figure given earlier in this paper (Figure 1, 
also appears here as Figure 3) on the notional life-cycle costs.  Figure 3 can been seen 
reproduced in many training materials or adapted to include milestone decision points or 
any number of concepts related to the acquisition of DoD weapon systems.  One 
substantive difference to note between this figure and the other variations on this figure is 
that some sources lump O&S and Disposal together, either as “O&S/Disposal” or just 
“O&S,” and put RDT&E and Procurement together as “Investment.”  In the OSD CAIG 
guide, Figure 3 has the caveat that “[d]epending on the system, costs or spending rates 
can peak at any phase in the program life cycle.”  
Since 1992, the OSD CAIG (now Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation 
[CAPE]) has issued one other O&S cost-estimating guide (2007) and prepared an update 
for 2012, which has not been released as of the publication of this thesis, but was given 
for reference by a member of the Air Force Cost Analysis Agency (AFCAA) to the 
authors.  Figure 4 is the updated version of Figure 3 given in these guides.  This seems to 
illustrate more of the overlapping tendencies of the stages in the life cycle.  Neither of the 
two more recent versions of the guide includes any further information on cost ratios, 
though all of them include assumptions about system life expectancy.  Table 4 
summarizes the system life expectancy conventions for 1992, 2007, and 2012.   
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Figure 3:  Notional Life-Cycle Costs for a DoD Weapon System (OSD CAIG, 1992) 
 
Figure 4:  Illustrative System Life Cycle (OSD CAIG, 2007; OSD CAPE, 2012) 
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Table 4:  Summary of Differences in Life Expectancy 
1992 2007 2012
Cargo 25 25 30‐40
Bomber 25 25 (30‐40)
Tanker (25) (25) 30‐40
Fighter 20 20 20‐30
Helicopter 20 20 20‐30
Small Missiles 15 (15) 10‐20
Large Missiles 20 (15) 10‐20
Electronic Equipment 10 10 10‐30
Ships 20‐40 20‐40 20‐40
Ground Combat Vehicles 20 20 20
UAVs N/A N/A 15‐25
Weapon System Life Expectancy (in years)
 
 
The numbers in bold in Table 4 show the changes from the previous edition, and 
those in parentheses are assumed due to changes in terminology among the three guides.  
As illustrated above, life expectancy has increased for most systems, most notably for the 
Cargo/Bomber/Tanker and Electronic Equipment categories.  Electronic Equipment, 
though, being a very ambiguous category, also includes certain equipment whose 
replacement may require a shorter life expectancy (less than five years) due to changes in 
cryptologic requirements, fragility, and technological obsolescence, among other things.  
This includes items such as radios, mobile antennas, and portable computers.  Even 
though these life expectancies are listed as “nominal,” due to natural human tendencies, 
“nominal” can easily be perceived as normal reality. 
This comparison of conventions was included to show how estimates of life 
expectancy have changed over time.  Although the 2012 CAPE O&S guide seems to have 
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changed life expectancy estimates based on trends seen in the real world, no source we 
found has shown the actual life cycles of fielded systems by category. 
In 1997, the Defense Systems Management College put out the third edition of 
their Acquisition Logistics Guide, which included the following: 
 
For software in particular, the development of a life-cycle management plan, with 
emphasis on the planning for transition to the support phase, is of paramount 
importance, since the majority of the cost of software (60 to 80 percent) is 
associated with postproduction support. 
 
As with many other sources, the standard issues were observed – no further 
citations were given, though this quote shows this ratio may apply more specifically to 
software.  This interval (60 to 80 percent) was also observed in an article in the Defense 
AT&L magazine on designing systems for supportability. (Dallosta & Simcik, 2012)  The 
authors state that “…total ownership costs (TOC) incurred during the operations and 
support (O&S) phase may constitute 65 percent to 80 percent of total life-cycle cost 
(LCC).”  Figure 5 accompanies this quote and has no further citation.  Note that the 
horizontal axis seems to denote a 30-year service life. 
One seemingly influential document is one prepared by the Institute for Defense 
Analyses (IDA) on a presentation by a panel of representatives from the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense (OSD), Naval Center for Cost Analysis (NCCA), Air Force Cost 
Analysis Agency (AFCAA), and the US Army Cost and Economic Analysis Center 
(USACEAC).  The presentation was given at the 32nd Annual DoD Cost Analysis  
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Figure 5:  Nominal Life-Cycle Cost Distribution (Dallosta & Simcik, 2012) 
 
Symposium (DoDCAS) conducted 3-5 February, 1999, in Williamsburg, Virginia (IDA, 
1999).  In this document, weapon system types are split out and presented in terms of 
their RDT&E, Procurement, and O&S costs, where the information is available.  Table 5 
is a summary of the information presented, which is cited in the Life-Cycle Cost article 
from the Defense Acquisition University’s ACQuipedia website.  (Defense Acquisition 
University, 2008)   
For most system types, the percentages reflect what was considered, at the time, 
to be “typical” percentages of life-cycle costs.  The exceptions were in the Rotary Wing 
Aircraft category, where the percentages came from the Comanche estimate in the 1997 
Selected Acquisition Report (SAR), and the Missiles and Surface Vehicles categories, 
which did not specifically state what the percentages represent, but we assumed them to 
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Table 5:  Cost Ratios by Weapon System Type (IDA, 1999)7 
System Type R&D Investment O&S/Disposal
Space 18% 66% 16%
Fixed‐Wing Aircraft 20% 39% 41%
Rotary‐Wing Aircraft 15% 52% 33%
Missiles 27% 33% 39%
Electronics 22% 43% 35%
Ships (Note 1) 1% 31% 68%
Surface Vehicles 9% 37% 54%
AIS (Note 2) 30% 70%  
 
be “typical” since no other discussion led us to believe otherwise.  The only two 
categories that come close to, or meet exactly, the golden ratio are the Ships and 
Automated Information Systems (AIS) categories.  This lends credence to the idea that 
members of the acquisition profession may have been taught that O&S costs can be “up 
to 70 percent” of total operational costs, being later revised through the deleterious 
effects of oral tradition to just “70 percent.”  This chart, and the presentation from which 
it was gleaned, still do not show the methodology of how the O&S/Disposal numbers 
were derived, whether from actual data or estimates from SARs.   
The data in Table 5 appear to be the source for the GAO Cost Estimating and 
Assessment Guide (US GAO, 2009) and some DAU material (DAU, 2009).  Figure 6 
                                                 
 
 
 
7 Note 1:  Most ship design costs are included in production cost of lead ship of a class.   
  Note 2:  Available data precludes split of pre-O&S costs into R&D and Investment categories.) 
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comes from the GAO guide.  The following paragraphs from the GAO guide describe 
what is being illustrated in the data. 
 
“While approaches may vary, an affordability assessment should address 
requirements at least through the programming period and, preferably, several 
years beyond. Thus, LCCEs give decision makers important information in that 
not all programs require the same type of funding profile. In fact, different 
commodities require various outlays of funding and are affected by different cost 
drivers. [Figure 6] illustrates this point with typical funding curves by program 
phase. It shows that while some programs may cost less to develop—for example, 
research and development in construction programs differ from fixed-wing 
aircraft—they may require more or less funding for investment, operations, and 
support in the out-years. (pg. 40) 
 
Studies have shown that information technology (IT) services outside software 
development and maintenance (for example, hardware cost, help desk, upgrade 
installation, training) can make up a majority of total ownership costs. In fact, 
OMB reports that 77 percent of the overall IT budget for fiscal year 2009 will 
support steady state IT operations while only 23 percent will be used for 
development, modernization, and enhancement.” (pg.139) 
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Figure 6:  Funding Profiles by Weapon System Types (US GAO, 2009) 
 
The brief discussion on the differences in funding profiles is very pertinent since 
every weapon system type seems to have its own nuances that will tend to deviate from 
the collective mean, whatever that may be.  This excerpt from the GAO guide raises 
questions regarding the way cost ratios for weapon systems are determined and reported.  
First, it mentions total ownership costs, which was defined previously as being similar 
but different than life-cycle costs.  Second, if total ownership costs or life-cycle costs are 
going to be discussed, we would not be necessarily interested in the amount spent on 
support operations for a given year.  We would need to know the support costs of a given 
program over the total life of the system.   Although the information on the IT budget for 
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a particular year is certainly worthy to know in some respects, it can be misleading to mix 
the ratios of a fiscal year with discussion on LCC. 
In 1997, the Defense Systems Management College published its Acquisition 
Logistics Guide, in which it illustrates “the dominant role that logistics plays in system 
life-cycle cost” (DSMC, 1997), as portrayed in Figure 7. This is the first time a ratio with 
this level of specificity is given (72% of life-cycle costs attributed to O&S).  It is also 
accompanied by a caption which gives insight into the data that supports the graphic, but 
does little else to enlighten the reader as to how the numbers were obtained.  The caption 
reads “Typical 1980 DoD Acquisition Program with A Service Life of About 30 Years.”  
This raises questions as to what was “typical” in the 1980’s, whether only programs with 
an expected service life of 30 years were considered or if a 30-year service life was used 
to normalize data, and whether this was an estimate from the SARs or from actual costs, 
among other important questions.  This also addresses the discussion between service life 
and life expectancy.  Even if this ratio were based on actual costs for systems that have 
already been fielded and retired, the fact that it was based on systems from the 1980s 
raises concerns on current validity. 
Figure 7 was found in at least four other sources – a 2000 GAO report entitled Air 
Force Operating and Support Cost Reductions Need Higher Priority (US GAO, 2000), a  
2003 GAO report on reducing TOC through setting requirements (US GAO, 2003), the 
Naval Postgraduate School’s Management of Defense Acquisition Projects (NPS, 2008), 
and an acquisition research paper through the NPS entitled Total Ownership Cost – Tools 
and Discipline (Naegle & Boudreau, 2011).  The 2000 GAO report gave a familiar 
commentary, stating “[operating and support] costs typically account for about 70 percent  
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Figure 7:  Nominal Life-Cycle Costs – (DSMC, 1997) 
 
or more of life-cycle costs, depending on how long a system remains in the inventory. 
[Figure 7] depicts the typical life-cycle cost distribution of many weapon systems.” As 
with many other reports and publications, this report gives some inkling of a research 
effort into actual costs of previous systems by adding some bit of “expert language”, as it 
states that this relationship of costs remains true “[a]ssuming these new systems are … 
consistent with past programs.” (pg. 15)  However, as shown previously, guidance on the 
lengths of life expectancies (and by extension, the service lives) of weapon systems 
appears to be increasing, adding more weight to the idea that any past relevance or 
accuracy of the “golden ratio” is fading. 
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Figure 7 shows its source to be from John F Phillips, Deputy Undersecretary of 
Defense (Logistics) from September 1996.  Unfortunately, we were unable to obtain the 
source document or briefing for this citation.  In a conversation with a former program 
director for the DAU we learned this information came from one of many Pentagon 
briefings that were updated occasionally, making it difficult to track down a copy of the 
source material.  In a presentation to INCOSE, this former DAU director used Figure 7 
and another remarkably similar figure (Figure 8) to illustrate system supportability.  
Figure 8 was described as a “typical 1970 DoD acquisition program with a service life of 
about 20 years.” (Gourley, 2008) 
 
 
Figure 8:  Nominal Life-Cycle Costs from DAU Presentation (Gourley, 2008) 
 
In the discussion concerning Base Year versus Then Year, these two figures help 
to serve as a visual aid to show the magnitude of the difference between the two terms.  
Assuming Figures 7 and 8 are based on estimates from the acquisition phase and 
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represent the BY, transformation of these costs into a TY estimate would significantly 
increase the costs of the program in the later years.  Since these figures show the last half 
of the program’s life cycle is O&S, a TY estimate would greatly escalate the costs in 
those years, potentially increasing the apparent portion of the sustainment phase to well 
over 80 percent in Figure 7.  If the converse is true, and these figures are built upon the 
TY, then the opposite effect would occur, possibly deescalating the O&S phase to below 
60 percent of LCC in Figure 7.  As discussed previously, since these figures appear to 
come from a comparison of systems, it is prudent to believe the analysis was done in BY.  
In any event, since the initial analyses that were performed to arrive at these ratios appear 
to have been on programs in the acquisition phase (“Typical 1980 DoD Acquisition 
Program with A Service Life of About 30 Years”, [DSMC, 1997; emphasis added]), and 
occurred at least as early as 1997, we are confident that these analyses are not necessarily 
valid for actual O&S and life-cycle costs for recent programs.  
Beyond the articles and papers examined thus far, there was little else to be found 
in the area of possible original sources for the “golden ratio”.  We find more recitation of 
“established” knowledge, particularly in GAO reports.  A report on the littoral combat 
ship (LCS) was particularly interested in educating the reader on O&S costs, as it stated 
six times throughout the report that O&S costs are “about” or “over 70%” of a program’s 
total costs.  Table 6 is a list of the other sources that shows roughly the same information. 
If we review current instructional material, we start to notice some shifting of 
ratios in data sources.  Some more recent DAU (DAU, 2012) and OSD CAPE (OSD 
CAPE, 2010) materials show different cost ratios than the 1999 IDA ratios, though no 
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Table 6:  Additional Sources for Cost Ratios8 
 
 
 
methodology is given for the origin of these data.  Figure 9 was taken from a slide 
presentation for DAU course BCF-215: Operating and Support Cost Analysis (DAU, 
2012).  Figure 10 was taken from a guest lecture to the same DAU course and, according 
to the guest lecturer Walt Cooper, was based on a sampling of SAR estimates in 2010 
(Cooper, 2010).  Both charts appear to have the same underlying data.  Again, these show 
O&S costs settling around 60-70% of LCC. 
Summary 
We have looked at the lengthy history of operations and support cost ratios, 
though this list is likely incomplete.  We have seen the general track of how we have 
settled on 70% as a talking point for O&S costs, though by now the reader should have a 
healthy skepticism of what that number really means.  Table 7 is a summary of the 
                                                 
 
 
 
8 The Boeing source listed was found at https://acc.dau.mil/adl/en-
US/22468/file/2189/Aerospace_Support.htm.  No mention of cost ratios appear to exist on Boeing’s current 
website. 
Source Report/Article  (Year of Publication) Quoted Percentage
GAO GAO/NSIAD‐00‐197  Higher Priority Needed for Army O&S  (2000) about 60‐70%
GAO GAO‐10‐257  LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP (2010) about/over 70%
GAO GAO‐12‐340  Improvements Needed to Enhance Oversight  (2012) about 70%
DoD DoD Weapon System Acq Reform: Product Support Assessment  (2009) 60‐75%
USD, ATL Pentagon Efficiency Initiatives, Remarks given at Heritage Foundation (2011) 70%
Boeing Military Aerospace Support , Seemingly abandoned webpage on C‐17 (2001) 70%
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Figure 9:  Cost Comparison from DAU Material (DAU, 2012) 
 
 
Figure 10:  Chart from Presentation by Walter Cooper (Cooper, 2010) 
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findings of the literature review.  It does not appear to be grounded in historical O&S 
data, but rather based on estimates of how long a weapon system will last and how costly 
it is to repair/replace/sustain/maintain/operate.   
 
Table 7:  Summary of Findings from Literature Review 
Source O&S Portion of LCC 
Sun Tzu, The Art of War, Sixth century B.C. 40% 
Marco Fiorello, Getting "Real Data for Life-Cycle Costing, 1975 50% 
T. W. Otto, Jr., Life Cycle Cost Model, 1975 24.4% 
US GAO, O&S Costs of New Weapon System, 1977 42.2% 
US GAO, Logistics Planning For The M1 Tank, 1981 70-90% 
OSD CAIG,  Operating and Support Cost Estimating Guide, 1992 78%, 84% 
DSMC, Acquisition Logistics Guide, 1997 60-80%, 72% 
IDA, Status of DoD's Capability to Estimate, 1999 Varies by Type 
US GAO, Higher Priority Needed for Army O&S, 2000 60-70% 
DoD, DoD Weapon System Acquisition Reform, 2009 60-75% 
US GAO, Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide, 2009 Varies by Type 
US GAO, Littoral Combat Ship, 2010 70% 
US GAO, Improvements Needed to Enhance Oversight, 2012 70% 
USD, ATL, Pentagon Efficiency Initiatives, 2011 70% 
Dallosta & Simcik, Designing for Supportability, 2012 65-80% 
Taylor & Murphy, OK, We Bought This Thing, 2012 45%, 60-80% 
 
Over time, we have learned a great deal about refurbishing weapon systems, to 
the point where we can sustain systems that are well beyond their originally planned 
useful life.  According to the USAF, the B-52, which had its first flight in 1954, has a 
place in our arsenal until 2040, if not beyond. (B-52 Stratofortress, 2011)  We also know 
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there are systems on the other end of the spectrum that require much less O&S funding 
due to the nature of the system, such as space systems.  To state that a “typical” DoD 
weapon system will have 70% of its total ownership costs attributed to O&S costs seems 
premature since there is a great deal of doubt that any person can properly identify what a 
“typical” DoD weapon system acquisition program would look like.  In the next chapter, 
we will review the methodology of how data was collected, analyzed, and interpreted.   
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III.  Methodology 
Chapter Overview 
In this chapter, we review the methods for collecting, analyzing, and interpreting 
the data used for analysis.  We review our assumptions and limiting factors, as well as 
any problems that may have arisen due to difficulties in data collection or analysis. 
Data Collection 
The initial phase of data collection started with trying to determine the source of 
the 70% O&S cost ratio.  To find articles, presentations, or publications that may have 
included this information, we used publicly available search resources.  Websites such as 
www.dtic.mil and www.gao.gov provided valuable starting points for literature on the 
topic.  The Defense Acquisition University’s website (www.dau.mil) provided 
information on current instruction materials.  We were able to communicate with some of 
the DAU instructors to determine sources for some of the data from the training materials 
they use.  Members of the Air Force Cost Analysis Agency (AFCAA), Naval Center for 
Cost Analysis (NCCA) and Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) provided further 
information on sources of information.  Most of the people we interviewed led us back to 
the OSD CAIG/CAPE O&S Cost Estimating Guides (OSD CAIG, 1992/1997; OSD 
CAPE, 2012) and the GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide (US GAO, 2009).   
The collection of actual cost and acquisition data for various programs was 
primarily performed in the published dissertation (Ryan, 2012).  The acquisition data 
were retrieved from the Defense Acquisition Management Information Retrieval 
(DAMIR) system.  The operations and support cost data were obtained from the Naval 
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Visibility and Management of Operations and Support Costs (Naval VAMOSC) and the 
Air Force Total Ownership Cost (AFTOC) systems.  Army O&S data available through 
the Operating and Support Management Information System (OSMIS) was reviewed for 
possible analysis. Due to data issues related to the allocation of costs, no Army system 
could be used for comparison.  Specifically, the fuel and personnel costs, among others 
were available at a top level, but could not be easily or readily allocated down to specific 
programs. 
The O&S data contained in the VAMOSC and AFTOC systems are arranged 
according to the OSD CAPE Cost Element Structure (CES).  The categories of the OSD 
CAPE CES are listed below.  These categories are listed in Chapter 6 of the 2007 OSD 
CAIG O&S Cost Estimating Guide (OSD CAIG, 2007). 
 
1.0 Unit-level Manpower  
Cost of operators, maintainers, and other support manpower assigned to operating 
units.  May include military, civilian, and/or contractor manpower. 
2.0 Unit Operations 
Cost of operators, maintainers, and other support manpower assigned to operating 
units.  May include military, civilian, and/or contractor manpower. 
3.0 Maintenance  
Cost of all system maintenance other than maintenance manpower assigned to 
operating units. Consists of organic and contractor maintenance. 
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4.0 Sustaining Support 
Cost of central support activities that can be attributed to a system and are 
provided by organizations other than operating units. 
5.0 Continuing System Improvements 
Cost of hardware and software modifications to keep the system operating and 
operationally current.   
6.0 Indirect Support 
Cost of support activities that provide general services that cannot be directly 
attributed to a system. Indirect support is generally provided by centrally managed 
activities that provide a wide range of activities. 
 
The list of programs to analyze was determined by a few factors. First, since we 
are limited in the availability of acquisition data, we are confined to the programs that 
report to Congress through Selected Acquisition Reports (SARs).  These programs are 
Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) that exceed $365 million (BY2000) in 
Research, Development, Test, & Evaluation (RDT&E) funding or $2.19 billion 
(BY2000) in Procurement funding, or have been designated by Congress or the DoD as 
an ACAT I program due to high visibility or interest.  This also excludes classified 
programs.   
Second, the program had to have O&S data, both in the SARs and the O&S cost 
systems.  The database did not contain any program that did not have an O&S estimate in 
the SAR due to the nature of the research for the dissertation.  Since O&S estimates were 
mandated to be included in SARs in 1989, this filtered the list further to those programs 
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that still submitted SARs from 1991 (when O&S estimates started to appear in SARs) 
through the present.  Each of these programs had to have fielded operational units and 
have a stable9 period of O&S costs.  This was to ensure the program was past the initial 
ramp-up in fielding and was able to produce a realistic estimate of annual costs.   
The last major selection criterion was that each program needed to have produced 
20% or more of the planned procurement quantities.  Early in production, contractors 
may run into difficulties that could change the production schedule or increase costs due 
to factors unknown when production commenced.  Until these issues are resolved, the 
acquisition cost has a significant risk or increasing.  
In all, the number of programs we were able to use for analysis was 37 – seven 
Air Force, 24 from the Navy, and six Joint programs.  Table 8 is the complete list of 
programs analyzed.  For Joint programs, the lead service is listed first. 
For each program, an annual unit cost (AUC)10 was derived to provide a way to 
compare programs at the unit level.  Each program presented unique challenges in 
calculating its own AUC.  A detailed methodology for determining the AUC for each 
program is given in the dissertation.  The general method used to derive the AUC was to 
take the annual cost for a system from VAMOSC or AFTOC and divide by the number of 
                                                 
 
 
 
9 “Stable” was understood to be a period where annual costs or AUC appear to be similar from 
year to year without obvious perturbations in costs for ramp-up or ramp-down. 
10 The AUC is not to be confused with the Program Acquisition Unit Cost (PAUC) or the Average 
Procurement Unit Cost (APUC) commonly used in DoD acquisitions.   
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units operational in the year.  The AUCs for the individual years were then averaged to 
provide one average AUC for the program. 
Table 8:  List of Programs Analyzed 
Ships Cargo/Tanker/Bomber
AOE 6 Navy C‐130J AF
CVN 68 (74/75) Navy C‐17A (BY96) AF
CVN 68 (76) Navy E‐2C Navy
DDG 51 Navy JSTARS (BY1998) Joint ‐ AF/Army
LHD 1 Navy KC‐135R AF
LPD 17 Navy Missiles Service
MHC 51 Navy AMRAAM Joint ‐ AF/Navy
SSGN Navy JASSM Joint ‐ AF/Navy
SSN 21 Navy AIM‐9X Joint ‐ Navy/AF
SSN 774 Navy JSOW (AGM‐154) Joint ‐ Navy/AF
STRATEGIC SEALIFT Navy
T‐AKE Navy Helicopters
T‐AO 187 Navy C/MH‐53E Navy
Fighters MH‐60R (BY2006) Navy
F‐16C/D AF MH‐60S Navy
F‐22 (BY2005) AF UAV
JPATS (BY2002) Joint ‐ AF/Navy GLOBAL HAWK AF
AV‐8B REMAN Navy PREDATOR AF
EA‐18G Navy Electronic Equipment
F/A‐18E/F (BY1990) Navy NESP Navy
F‐14D Navy Tilt‐rotor
T‐45TS (BY1995) Navy V‐22 (BY2005) Navy  
 
Before performing this calculation for AUC, the annual cost data were normalized 
to FY2010 using various DoD inflationary sources, such as the Joint Inflation Calculator 
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(Jan-11), Naval VAMOSC ATMSR User Manual FYs 1997-Present v10 (28-Feb-11), 
and the SAF/FMCEE Inflation Calculator – FY2011 Edition, among others as 
appropriate.  Once normalized to FY10, the costs per year were deescalated back to the 
base year of the program.11   
Certain programs reported more than one baseline year due to changes or 
milestones in the program.  For example, the V-22 Osprey changed its baseline year from 
BY1986 to BY2005 due to the program passing Milestone C (the decision to move from 
development to production).  This artificially provided more units for analysis.  Since we 
were not concerned with previous estimates of acquisition costs, the earlier baseline on 
all programs that presented multiple baselines were removed from analysis.  This was 
done under the assumption that the most recent acquisition report has the most accurate 
acquisition data.    
Analysis 
One of the unknowns in this analysis was the expected life of each program.  To 
get an idea of the range of percentages for O&S costs we could expect, we took the life 
expectancies from the OSD CAIG/CAPE guides to use as a starting point.  The life 
expectancies of each program as given in their respective SARs were also considered.  
                                                 
 
 
 
11 All acquisition costs in SARs are normalized to a particular base year representing a major 
occurrence in the program, such as program initiation or a major milestone decision.  Due to unknown 
factors not described in the SARs for every program, this method was far easier and more reliable than 
normalizing the acquisition data to FY2010. 
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From these estimates, we chose the highest and lowest expectancies to use as an upper 
and lower range, respectively.   Multiplying the actual AUC derived earlier by the highest 
(or lowest) life expectancy for a program and by the number of units to be procured (as 
given by the last or most recent SAR) provided our estimate of O&S costs.   To get the 
ratio of O&S-to-LCC, we divide the O&S estimate by the total of the O&S estimate and 
the acquisition actual cost.   
This method does not take into account ramp-up or ramp-down, demilitarization, 
changes in operations tempo, or attrition.  It assumes all units will be operational from the 
first year of fielding through the last year of its life expectancy.  This method does not 
take into account any service life extensions or modification programs. Since the costs for 
each of these programs included wartime costs from 1989 - 2010, there is no assumption 
of peacetime operations that normally accompanies O&S estimates.   
For comparison among groups, simple descriptive statistics were derived using 
Microsoft Excel 10 for each category of weapon system, for both the high and low ends 
of the range.  Results were graphed using a histogram against the mean to determine the 
existence and effect of outliers on the average.  We determined that the median was more 
representative of most results.  As will be explained later, certain categories showed 
significant skew in a direction contrary to what the data appeared to show when using the 
mean. 
Summary 
Much of the data collection originated from the dissertation mentioned 
previously.  Although relaxing the inclusion criteria for DoD weapon systems would 
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have provided additional systems for analysis, the original database was kept intact to 
reduce the error due to data collection and the calculation of the AUC and to maintain a 
level of homogeneity.  The analysis of the data utilized standard statistical concepts and 
tools to determine estimates for each of the major weapon system categories given in the 
2007 OSD CAPE guide (OSD CAPE, 2007).  Chapter Four reviews the results of the 
analysis and reviews some of the complications encountered.   
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IV.  Analysis and Results 
Chapter Overview 
The results in this chapter show a different picture of sustainment costs than what 
is presented in the DoD acquisition community.  Although not all weapon system 
categories are represented or are represented by few data points, this should provide the 
basis for new insights into sustainment costs.  Throughout this chapter, the reader is 
cautioned to remember that the relative cost to sustain the weapon system, as it will be 
portrayed here, is related to its acquisition cost.   
Results  
The first set of results pertains to the life expectancies of each program.   For most 
systems, the life expectancy from the SARs fell within the ranges given in the OSD O&S 
guides.  These expectancies are presented in Table 9 and are given in years.  One of the 
interesting pieces of information in this table is that of the Missiles group – only one of 
the programs fell within the 10-20 year expected life given in the OSD guides.  This 
illustrates the notional aspect of the life expectancy ranges. 
Using these ranges, we were able to estimate an approximate range of 43-56% 
(mean) or 48-63% (median) for the proportion of life-cycle costs attributable to O&S.  
These ranges are for all weapon systems and both services.  The “high” end of the range 
(using the upper estimate of life expectancy) went from 4.91% (JSOW) to 88.79% (KC-
135R) with a standard deviation of 22.48%.  The “low” end (using the lower estimate of 
life expectancy) started at 1.69% (JSOW) and went through 83.19% (KC-135R) with a 
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standard deviation of 21.56%.  Table 10 is the summary of some of the statistics for all 
programs.  Figure 11 is a chart of the average O&S cost percentages by program. 
Table 9:  Life Expectancies for Various Weapon Systems 
Ships High (yrs) Low (yrs) Cargo/Tanker/Bomber High (yrs) Low (yrs)
AOE 6 40 20 C‐130J 50 25
CVN 68 (74/75) 50 20 C‐17A (BY96) 40 25
CVN 68 (76) 50 20 E‐2C 40 20
DDG 51 40 20 JSTARS (BY1998) 40 25
LHD 1 40 20 KC‐135R 40 25
LPD 17 40 20 Missiles
MHC 51 40 20 AMRAAM 40 10
SSGN 40 20 JASSM 20 10
SSN 21 40 20 AIM‐9X 33 10
SSN 774 40 20 JSOW (AGM‐154) 30 10
STRATEGIC SEALIFT 40 20 Helicopters
T‐AKE 40 20 C/MH‐53E 30 20
T‐AO 187 40 20 MH‐60R (BY2006) 30 20
Fighters MH‐60S 35 20
F‐16C/D 30 20 UAV
F‐22 (BY2005) 30 20 GLOBAL HAWK 34 15
JPATS (BY2002) 30 20 PREDATOR 25 15
AV‐8B REMAN 30 20 Electronic Equipment
EA‐18G 30 20 NESP 30 10
F/A‐18E/F (BY1990) 30 20 Tilt‐rotor
F‐14D 30 20 V‐22 (BY2005) 43 30
T‐45TS (BY1995) 30 20  
 
Table 10:  Summary Statistics for All Programs 
 Mean Median Std Dev -1 Std Dev +1 Std Dev IQR 
High 55.92% 62.57% 22.74% 33.18% 78.66% 24.56% 
Low 43.85% 48.33% 21.96% 21.89% 65.81% 24.88% 
Average 49.88% 54.09% 23.02% 26.87% 72.90% 32.96% 
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Figure 11:  Averages of O&S Percentages by Program 
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The wide dispersion of data highlights the vast differences among the weapon 
systems in terms of sustainment and emphasizes the need to further reduce the set of 
programs into different types.  Logically, the weapon system types given by the OSD 
O&S guides (Table 9) seem reasonable.  The Tilt-Rotor class is not given in the OSD 
guides and was treated separately due to the unique nature of its operations.  We review 
each class next. 
Ships 
The Ships category includes all types of naval vessels designed to operate on or 
under the sea.  Thirteen ships were included in this analysis.  There are significant 
differences in the types of ships being used in the Navy today, from size to mission and 
capabilities to logistical support structure.  In terms of proportions of O&S costs to LCC, 
only two programs fell outside two standard deviations from the mean.  Although both of 
these programs were submarines, we could not determine that this difference is inherent 
to the entirety of the class of submarines.  As will be discussed, other factors are clearly 
at work to add to the large disparity observed.  Table 11 provides the summary statistics 
for the Ships category.  Figure 12 depicts the averages of O&S percentage of each 
program in the Ships category.   
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Table 11:  Summary Statistics for Ships Category 
 Mean Median Std Dev -1 Std Dev +1 Std Dev IQR 
High 56.30% 61.53% 17.78% 38.52% 63.33% 18.91% 
Low 40.12% 44.44% 15.09% 25.03% 44.25% 18.65% 
Average 48.21% 51.12% 18.14% 30.07% 66.35% 23.62% 
 
 
Figure 12:  Averages of O&S Percentage by Program – Ships 
 
Figure 12 shows the dramatic difference between two of the submarine programs 
and the rest of the Ships category.  The two programs in question are the SSN 21(Seawolf 
class) and SSN 774 (Virginia class).  There was one other submarine in the class, SSGN 
(Ohio class), which held an estimate for O&S proportion closer to the other ships in the 
class.  The SSN 21 O&S proportion was estimated to fall within 11.65% and 20.87%, and 
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the SSN 774 was estimated to fall between 12.65% and 22.46%.  Although the average 
for each ship falls just within two standard deviations of the mean for the category, 
analysis specifically on the high and low ranges for each system compared to the other 
systems showed a significant impact on the mean.  To remove this possible bias, we 
removed all submarines from the Ship category and ran another analysis.  Table 12 
presents the summary statistics of the Ships category after removing the three 
submarines. 
 
Table 12:  Summary Statistics for Ships category without Submarines 
 Mean Median Std Dev -1 Std Dev +1 Std Dev IQR 
High 62.01% 64.09% 10.10% 51.90% 72.11% 16.28% 
Low 44.52% 45.80% 9.60% 34.91% 54.12% 14.57% 
Average 53.26% 53.12% 13.13% 40.13% 66.40% 16.97% 
 
As expected, the mean and median increase somewhat and look more alike.  The 
standard deviation decreases, though it is still over 13%.  The Interquartile Range (IQR), 
which contains the middle 50% of the data, decreases, as well, showing a smaller 
dispersion of the data.  Since the submarine classes of Ships appear to be troublesome, 
we reviewed this class a little more to determine certain qualities that might be significant 
factors in sustainment. 
The estimated sustainment proportions for the three submarine systems are 
summarized in Table 13.  The SSGN range falls closer to the average of the Ships than to 
 
52 
the other submarine types.  A look into the acquisition and sustainment costs for these 
systems sheds more light on the apparent reasons for the disparity.  Table 14 is a 
summary of the acquisition and estimated sustainment costs for these systems.  Next is a 
brief look into each system. 
 
Table 13:  Summary Acquisition and Support Costs – Submarines 
Submarines High Low Average 
SSGN 68.51% 52.11% 60.31% 
SSN 21 20.87% 11.65% 16.26% 
SSN 774 22.46% 12.65% 17.56% 
 
Table 14:  Summary Acquisition and Support Costs - Submarines 
 
 
The SSGN is an Ohio-class guided-missile submarine that is roughly 560 feet 
long (42-foot beam) and displaces 18,750 tons (submerged) (US Navy, 2012).  Its crew 
complement is 15 Officers and 144 Enlisted members, with the capacity to host up to 66 
Special Operations Forces (SOF) members (US Navy, 2012).  The SSGN program 
converted four SSBN (“B” designation is for ballistic missile) submarines to the guided-
missile configuration, as well as add communications and mission capabilities (US Navy, 
2012).   
SSGN (BY2002) 3,867.40$         4,207.57$                     8,415.14$                       52.59$                4
SSN 21 (BY1990) 12,332.10$      1,626.19$                     3,252.38$                       27.10$                3
SSN 774 (BY1995) 63,219.50$      9,156.59$                     18,313.17$                     15.26$                30
# of 
Units
Program Name
Acquisition 
Costs ($M)
Sustainment 
Estimate (20 yrs $M)
Sustainment 
Estimate (40 yrs, $M)
Annual Unit 
Costs ($M)
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The SSN 21 is a Seawolf-class submarine measuring 353 feet (40-foot beam) and 
displaces 9,138 tons (submerged) (US Navy, 2012).  There are two other submarines in 
this class – the SSN 22 with the same characteristics, and the SSN 23 measuring 453 feet 
with a displacement of 12,158 tons (submerged) (US Navy, 2012).  The crew 
complement is 14 Officers and 126 Enlisted (US Navy, 2012).  The SSN 21 program 
included costs for all three submarines and all three were newly constructed. 
The SSN 774 is a Virginia-class submarine measuring 377 feet (33-foot beam) 
and displacing 7,800 tons (submerged) (US Navy, 2012).  The crew complement is 15 
Officers and 117 Enlisted members (US Navy, 2012).  The SSN 774 program includes 
costs for 30 planned, newly-constructed submarines (US Navy, 2012).   
Although the SSGN is the largest of the three classes, it had the smallest 
acquisition cost due to its acquisition strategy of conversion vice new construction.  The 
SSGN also has the largest AUC of the three classes, presumably due primarily to its size 
and crew complement.  These appear to be the main factors driving the disparities among 
the submarines.  As far as what makes a submarine different than surface ships in terms 
of O&S/LCC cost ratio, that analysis is beyond the scope of this analysis and is 
recommended as a follow-on research topic. 
For surface ships, the expected O&S cost ratio from this analysis is 55% - 64% of 
LCC.  Most of these ships were new development and construction.  Due to the 
dispersion of the ship systems seen in Figure 12, we believe there is ample evidence that 
the Ships category may be further broken down into other categories, though what those 
categories should be is beyond the scope of this research. 
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Fighter Aircraft 
The Fighter Aircraft category included eight weapon systems, including two 
training systems, JPATS (Air Force/Navy) and T-45TS (Navy).  As with the Ships 
category, the data has a wide dispersion, though this time it is from opposite ends of the 
spectrum.  The summaries are broken out by All Programs, Air Force, and Navy in 
Tables 15-17. 
 
Table 15:  Summary Statistics for All Fighter Programs 
 Mean Median Std Dev -1 Std Dev +1 Std Dev IQR 
High 57.60% 56.48% 15.17% 42.43% 72.77% 21.53% 
Low 48.38% 46.41% 15.69% 32.70% 64.07% 22.07% 
Average 52.99% 51.46% 15.65% 37.34% 68.64% 23.42% 
 
Table 16:  Summary Statistics for Air Force Fighter Aircraft 
 Mean Median Std Dev -1 Std Dev +1 Std Dev IQR 
High 58.77% 65.77% 20.88% 37.89% 79.66% 19.99% 
Low 49.93% 56.16% 20.87% 29.07% 70.80% 20.16% 
Average 54.35% 60.97% 19.29% 35.06% 73.64% 26.17% 
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Table 17:  Summary Statistics for Navy Fighter Aircraft 
 Mean Median Std Dev -1 Std Dev +1 Std Dev IQR 
High 56.90% 54.58% 13.53% 43.37% 70.42% 11.36% 
Low 47.45% 44.48% 14.49% 32.96% 61.95% 11.15% 
Average 52.17% 47.68% 14.12% 38.05% 66.30% 12.74% 
 
The low end of the range is occupied by the F-22 program with a range of 26.66% 
to 35.29%.  The F-22 started to be developed in 1986 and delivered its first aircraft from 
the production line in June 2003 (USAF, 2007).  The upper end is occupied by the AV-
8B Harrier II Remanufacture program with a range of 71.64% to 79.12%.  This program 
modified existing Harriers to the most recent configuration, limiting program funding to 
Procurement (no development) (US Navy, 2002).  As seen with the submarines, the 
significant difference between the newly developed system and the 
conversion/reconfiguration of older systems is significant. 
As mentioned earlier, in this data set are two training programs.  The Joint 
Primary Aircraft Training System (JPATS) is a joint program between the Air Force and 
Navy (Air Force is the lead service) utilizing the T-6A Texan II, a derivative of the 
Raytheon Beech/Pilatus PC-9 Mk II (US Navy, 2007).  The T-45 Training System (T-
45TS) is a Navy program utilizing a derivative of the British Aerospace Hawk (USAF, 
2010).  The JPATS O&S ratio range (66.97% - 75.26%) came close to that of the AV-8B, 
while the T-45TS range (35.63% - 45.36%) was closer to the F-22.  The differences do 
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not appear to be due to the service lead (AF vs. Navy), but rather to the characteristics of 
the program.  A summary of actual costs of the programs appears in Table 18.12  
Table 18:  Summary of Training Programs 
 
 
JPATS experienced a lower acquisition cost and will experience a higher O&S 
cost, contributing to the stark difference between the two programs.  Though other 
programmatic factors undoubtedly played a role, the fundamental difference between the 
acquisition costs of these two systems is the aircraft being used.  JPATS uses an aircraft 
powered by a turbo-prop engine and can take off and land on traditional land-based 
runways (USAF, 2010).  The T-45 is powered by a turbofan engine and was modified to 
be able to take off and land on a carrier using the catapult and tail-hook systems (US 
Navy, 2007).    
Even with the extremes of these systems, all eight fell within two standard 
deviations of the means and medians of the Fighter category.  This analysis estimated a 
                                                 
 
 
 
12 By chance, each program experienced a baseline event in FY1995.  Since initial analysis by 
Ryan, et al. was performed for BY1995 for each program, the data was not converted further to any other 
base year. 
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range for the ratios of O&S costs to be 48.38% - 57.60% (mean) and 46.41% - 56.48% 
(median).   
Cargo/Tanker/Bomber Aircraft  
Five airframes were included in this category: three Air Force, one Navy, and one 
joint (J-STARS, Air Force/Army).  One program stood out as anomalous in this group: 
the KC-135R.  Overall, the ratios for this category were 59.19% - 71.11% (mean) and 
54.20% - 70.30% (median).  The KC-135R ranges were 83.19% - 88.79%.  Although the 
upper estimate for the KC-135 fell within two standard deviations of the mean, the 
estimate for the low end exceeded two standard deviations.  This airframe was removed 
and the analysis was performed again on the remaining four systems.  Without the KC-
135R, the Cargo/Tanker/Bomber category was estimated to have ranges of 53.18% - 
66.70% (mean) and 52.65% - 66.44% (median).  The results are summarized in Tables 19 
and 20.13 
The KC-135R program converted existing KC-135A aircraft into a different 
configuration with, among other updates, more efficient engines (USAF, 2011).  
Development costs were greatly diminished over a newly constructed airframe, making 
the O&S portion of the LCC the overwhelming portion of this platform’s costs.   
                                                 
 
 
 
13 Summaries were not broken out by service since only one weapon system in this category was 
managed by the Navy and one system was a joint program. 
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Table 19:  Summary Statistics for Cargo/Tanker/Bomber Aircraft 
 Mean Median Std Dev -1 Std Dev +1 Std Dev IQR 
High 71.11% 70.30% 11.97% 59.14% 83.08% 13.12% 
Low 59.19% 54.20% 14.40% 44.79% 73.58% 9.79% 
Average 65.15% 61.73% 13.98% 51.17% 79.12% 19.13% 
 
Table 20:  Summary Statistics for Cargo/Tanker/Bomber Aircraft without KC-135R 
 Mean Median Std Dev -1 Std Dev +1 Std Dev IQR 
High 66.70% 66.44% 7.80% 58.89% 74.50% 10.17% 
Low 53.18% 52.65% 6.02% 47.16% 59.20% 5.91% 
Average 59.94% 59.55% 9.68% 50.26% 69.62% 11.08% 
 
Missiles 
The Missile category consisted of four programs, each of them being jointly 
acquired. The Air Force and Navy each acted as lead service on two of the programs.  
The O&S ranges were estimated to be 4.64% - 12.06% (mean) and 3.81% - 9.07% 
(median).  The Navy had simultaneously the highest and lowest estimates, revealing no 
trend in management differences between the services.  The AIM-9X had the highest 
estimated percentage range in this group.  This program was also the only one of this 
group to be considered a variant, being in its fifth generation (US Navy, 2011).   
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One other piece of information to note in this set of results is that the life 
expectancies for all but one missile system (JASSM) were well beyond the guidance 
given in the OSD guides.  For the Missiles category, the rule of thumb for life expectancy 
is 10-20 years.  Per the SARs for each program, the expectancies for each program were 
40 years (AMRAAM), 33 years (AIM-9X), 30 years (JSOW), and 20 years (JASSM).  
Logically, the length of time a system is in the operations and sustainment phase of its 
life cycle has a considerable impact on the funding needed in later years.  Whether or not 
these missile systems will exist for as long as they are planned to exist, only time will 
tell.  If missile systems can be expected to last beyond 30 years, the guidance should be 
updated to reflect reality.  The descriptive statistics are shown in Table 21.   
 
Table 21:  Summary Statistics for Missiles 
 Mean Median Std Dev -1 Std Dev +1 Std Dev IQR 
High 12.06% 9.07% 9.06 3.00% 21.12% 7.46% 
Low 4.64% 3.81% 3.56% 1.08% 8.20% 4.63% 
Average 8.35% 6.56% 7.51% 0.84% 15.85% 5.43% 
 
Rotary-Wing 
All three rotary-wing systems were managed by the Navy, and all three are 
considered variants.  Two of the systems, the MH-60 R and MH-60S, are very similar 
platforms, sharing a “common cockpit” and having the same general dimensions and 
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propulsion system (NAVAIR, 2012).   The dissimilarities in mission and the number of 
fielded units presumably cause these two aircraft to be on the opposite sides of a narrow 
range of estimated O&S costs.  Table 22 summarizes this category. 
 
Table 22:  Summary Statistics for Rotary Wing Aircraft 
 Mean Median Std Dev -1 Std Dev +1 Std Dev IQR 
High 74.88% 76.52% 3.51% 71.37% 78.40% 6.41% 
Low 66.57% 68.48% 4.12% 62.45% 70.70% 3.78% 
Average 70.73% 70.13% 5.70% 65.03% 76.43% 6.39% 
 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) 
Only two UAV systems managed by the Air Force were analyzed – the Global 
Hawk (RQ-4) and the Predator (MQ-1B).  The range of O&S proportions was 64.92% - 
78.20% (mean and median) with an average of 71.56%.  The Predator occupies the top 
spot in this category, having more flying hours per year (191,070 versus 6,679 for 
FY2010) than the Global Hawk (AFCAP, 2013), as well as having a less-expensive 
acquisition program ($3.46 billion [BY2008] versus $11.29 billion [BY2000]) (USAF, 
2009; 2010).   
The fundamental differences among UAV systems are magnified greatly when 
taking into consideration the UAV systems being employed by the Army.  For example, 
the Global Hawk, operated by the US Air Force, has a wingspan of 130.9 feet with a 
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range of 8,700 nautical miles (USAF, 2012).  The Raven, operated by the US Army, has 
a wingspan of 4.5 feet and a range of 5.4 nautical miles (AeroVironment, 2012).  The 
former takes off using a normal runway.  The latter can be launched by hand.  Due to 
these vast differences, it would not be practical to recommend an O&S cost ratio for the 
entire range of UAVs.  Separate analysis should be performed to determine different 
classes of UAVs and their cost ratios. 
In early 2012, the US Air Force announced it will retire its fleet of Global Hawk – 
Block 30 aircraft (Majumdar, 2012).  Although other blocks of the Global Hawk may still 
be used by the Air Force and Navy in the future, removing this particular version of the 
aircraft will drastically change the life cycle proportions.  The data collected for this 
analysis went through FY2010 and did not include any adjustments for this 
announcement.   
Electronic Equipment 
The category of Electronic Equipment potentially contains more numbers of 
systems that could be considered than the other categories we analyzed. Unfortunately, 
only one system was reviewed – the Navy Extremely High Frequency (EHF) Satellite 
Communications (SATCOM) Program (NESP).  This system provides command, control, 
and communications (C3) capabilities to land- and sea-based operating locations utilizing 
existing MILSTAR I and II satellites (US Navy, 2004).  The range of the sustainment 
portion of LCC was 8.74% - 22.32% with an average of 15.53%.   
The category of Electronic Equipment can encompass so many subcomponents of 
many DoD weapon systems utilizing different acquisition and maintenance strategies that 
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it may be difficult to identify an acceptable target for O&S costs.  The NESP was 
developed specifically for the Navy.  Some communications or computing systems can 
be acquired using mainly commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) equipment with little or no 
modification for military use, drastically reducing or eliminating development costs.  
Some systems cannot be maintained by the contractor that produced the equipment due to 
obsolescence or the collapse of the company before the completion of the life cycle of the 
system.  Although we did determine a range of the expected O&S proportion of LCC, we 
cannot in good faith determine this range to be true for all or most electronic systems. 
Tilt-rotor 
Tilt-rotor weapon systems are new to the inventory of fielded DoD systems.  As 
such, there is only one system to analyze – the V-22 Osprey.  The range of sustainment 
costs was estimated to be 60.95% - 69.11%.  This range was derived using the calculated 
AUC and the estimates for life expectancies from the SARs (vice the OSD CAPE guide) 
for the V-22 since there is no guidance from other sources.   
This program is currently developing and producing three variants concurrently, 
each of which will log a different number of flight hours per year.  Contrary to the other 
systems we analyzed, the V-22 is still being fielded with a significant number of units to 
be fielded in future years (112 of 459 units fielded by December 2010).  This could lead 
to the sustainment costs being a substantially greater portion of LCC than we estimated.   
Another point to consider with this program is the significant learning curve that 
was surmounted to produce this technology.  Many technical challenges concerning the 
underlying physical and dynamic properties of this aircraft took significant effort to 
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understand and overcome.   This program came under fire for a number of fatalities that 
occurred in the development and testing phases due to some of these challenges 
(Congressional Research Service, 2005).  The program is fielding a now-proven 
technology at considerable cost that will provide an important stepping stone for further 
development efforts.  The development costs (relative to the sustainment costs) for future 
iterations of this weapon system type may be significantly less thanks to the effort 
exerted through this program.   
New Development 
Since the work performed on this database to this point has shown a possible 
connection between high O&S proportions and variant/modification programs, an 
additional analysis was performed on all newly-developed systems.  The resulting list 
included 22 systems.  The ranges for O&S proportions for this group were 35.09% - 
47.00% (mean) and 36.97% - 53.98% (median).  The decreases in proportions from the 
larger group of systems including variant and modification programs seems to show there 
is some credence to the notion that new systems will have more life-cycle costs devoted 
to acquisition than to sustainment.  Table 23 summarizes the results. 
Table 23:  Summary Statistics for New Programs 
 Mean Median Std Dev -1 Std Dev +1 Std Dev IQR 
High 47.00% 53.98 23.60% 23.40% 70.60% 44.18% 
Low 35.09% 36.97% 21.27% 13.82% 56.36% 38.44% 
Average 41.04% 45.84% 22.99% 18.05% 64.04% 37.91% 
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Investigative Questions Answered 
To conclude this chapter, we revisit the questions we identified as our major 
points of research.  The main theme of this research was to determine the source of the 
widely-held and published belief that O&S costs for a Department of Defense weapon 
system comprise 70% of the total life-cycle costs of the system. 
Did the figure come about through an identifiable study or through common 
practice?  The “golden ratio” espoused by many in the acquisition community does not 
appear to have come from any single study.  Further, some of the terms being used to 
describe life-cycle costs, and specifically O&S costs, are not readily distinguished from 
other similar terms, complicating the understanding of the topic at hand.  Although some 
O&S actual cost data may have been used for a few systems, whether from antecedent 
systems or from test data for the system being acquired, this data was not widely 
collected or analyzed to determine the ratio in question. 
If a source can be found, are the source and/or methodology credible?  The 
sources found gave limited, if any, information based on the estimates of life expectancy, 
annual cost, and other factors not immediately known due to the lack of detailed 
methodology for each program.  A credible methodology could not be discovered or 
determined due to this absence of information.  Therefore, there appears to be no 
empirical data to support this notion of 70% of life-cycle costs being attributable to the 
O&S phase for a “typical” DoD weapon system. 
If a source is found and was valid at some point, is the information still valid?  
Since no empirical source was found, questions of validity are quickly dismissed.  
However, regardless of historical validity, any cost information for previous systems 
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needs to be evaluated for current validity.  Logically, as systems are built using more 
robust technologies and materials, these estimates of life-cycle proportions should 
change.  Sometimes a system proves to be more valuable and flexible than originally 
intended and is kept alive in the nation’s arsenal far longer than anyone could have 
expected.  As investors have been instructed by any investment broker, past performance 
is no guarantee for future performance.   
Can a more accurate model be developed?  Although this analysis lacks a certain 
level of completeness, it illustrates the great differences among the weapon system types 
in terms of proportional life-cycle costs.  Instead of talking about the “standard” 
exceptions to the 70% mantra, namely space systems and the B-52, the acquisition 
community should embrace the variability of sustainment costs in DoD weapon systems.  
We have shown that even within the Submarine category there can be a great deal of 
variation depending on how the vessel is acquired and its size.  As some programs 
reviewed in this analysis have shown, it is sometimes more cost-effective, in terms of 
acquisition costs, to have modification or life-extension programs than to create new 
systems.  Under times of increasing budget consciousness, modification programs may 
become more normal.  More analysis needs to be done to more properly identify cost 
ratios, but this analysis has shown a better model is possible.   
Summary 
This chapter presented our findings on each of the weapon system categories in 
our research.  Due to the selection criteria used to identify the programs to be used, 
certain categories, such as Space Systems, Electronic Equipment, and Rotary Wing 
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Aircraft, were underrepresented and deserve further research.  For the systems analyzed, 
the average percentage of life-cycle costs attributable to O&S is 49.88% (mean) and 
54.09% (median).  Due to the great variability in the averages for each type of weapon 
system type, further analysis was performed on each weapon system category.  Table 24 
summarizes the averages derived for each weapon system type.   
Table 24:  Summary of Average O&S Cost Percentages 
 Mean Median 
Ships 48.21% 51.12% 
Ships – No Submarines 53.26% 51.46% 
Fighter Aircraft 52.99% 51.46% 
Cargo/Tanker/Bomber Aircraft 65.15% 61.73% 
C/T/B – No KC-135R 59.94% 59.55% 
Missiles 8.35% 6.56% 
Rotary Wing Aircraft 70.73% 70.13% 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 71.56% 71.56% 
Electronic Equipment 15.53% 15.53% 
Tilt Rotor Aircraft 65.03% 65.03% 
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V.  Conclusions and Recommendations 
Chapter Overview 
The conclusions of this research can be useful in understanding the impact of 
certain factors of weapon systems acquisition on the sustainment of DoD systems.  The 
recommendations herein are meant to provide for a more informed acquisition 
community and spawn future research efforts into O&S costs. 
Conclusions of Research 
The main conclusion of this research is that a “golden ratio” of 70% O&S to 30% 
Acquisition costs for a “typical” DoD weapon system is not supportable at a macro level 
in the DoD.  The variability of the data also shows that a ratio for the DoD at any 
percentage is unreasonable due to the great differences in acquiring and sustaining each 
weapon system.  The use of any such ratios to describe “typical” systems in portfolio 
analysis or elsewhere is inadvisable.  Although it is important to consider certain aspects 
of the data analyzed in this thesis when determining affordability of current and future 
systems, the DoD needs to more completely understand the implications of the story 
being told by the actual costs being incurred by the weapon systems it possesses.   
The notion of O&S costs being 70% of LCC has been circulating around the 
Department of Defense acquisition community for more than 15 years.  Its inception 
appears to come from an amalgamation of estimates of the O&S weapon system costs 
given by program offices or other official sources, such as Selected Acquisition Reports, 
at some point in the 1990s.  This collection of estimates also appears to contain “typical” 
(whatever this was intended to mean) DoD programs with a 30-year service life from the 
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1980s.  An analysis of actual sustainment costs of already fielded systems and how these 
costs relate to LCC had not been performed in the past, at least not in any readily-
available literature.  With the recently increasing focus on O&S costs, an earnest look 
into actual sustainment costs needed to be performed. 
One of the interesting items to come out of this research was the variable nature 
of life expectancies.  In two decades, many weapon system categories experienced an 
increase in their recommended life expectancies, as given by the OSD O&S cost 
estimating guides from 1992 through 2012.  There also seems to be a mixing of 
terminology – a possible misunderstanding between the related, but very different, terms 
“service life” and “life expectancy.”  A look at the actual useful lives, as well as the 
expected lives, of our systems will show that not only are we capable of sustaining our 
weapon systems far beyond their intended lives, we are able to extend the capabilities of 
existing seaframes and airframes through modification with lower acquisition costs than a 
newly created system.   
This analysis was intended to be a first-pass look at a topic of great concern and 
scrutiny in recent years.  The level of analysis for operations and support costs using 
actual cost data can be greatly expanded to include the other aspects of a weapon system, 
such as normal steady-state unit levels, typical attrition rates, and ramp-up and ramp-
down activities, to name a few.   
Although our approach was simplistic, it underscores the great differences in 
sustainment ranges among the weapon system categories.  The need to identify 
exemptions to the 70% “rule”, or any supposed rule for that matter, does not properly 
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illustrate the categorical differences of DoD weapon systems – in acquisition, 
sustainment, logistics, etc.   
Significance of Research 
By illustrating the variability of life-cycle proportions among weapon system 
categories, we have started to show a more realistic picture of what program analysts and 
portfolio managers can expect in terms of sustainment costs.  This research has begun to 
open a window into the real effects of acquisition strategy on life-cycle costs.  In the face 
of looming budget cuts over the next decade, leaders across the DoD and Congress are 
struggling to make tough decisions regarding our nation’s arsenal.  Only with a full 
understanding of how our acquisition decisions affect our long-term sustainment costs 
can we make the right decisions on what capabilities are needed and how we will acquire 
those capabilities. 
Recommendations for Action 
This research is intended to be a first-pass at a new line of research into actual 
sustainment costs of DoD systems.  The body of knowledge in the realm of actual O&S 
cost proportions is relatively small.  Further study into the differences between what we 
estimate as an annual cost and what we realize as an annual cost for our weapon systems 
is needed to provide more accurate estimates for affordability assessments.  The 
government has sponsored many studies on the problems of the acquisition process, but 
has not spent the necessary capital to understand the problems, or even current state, of 
actual sustainment costs for fielded systems.  We recommend more intensive study into 
the true costs of sustaining DoD weapon systems, both past and present. 
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Recommendations for Future Research 
Future research related to this analysis can be performed in each of the weapon 
system categories to better determine the expected proportions of O&S costs to life-cycle 
costs.  The method of analysis for this paper was limited and did not take into account 
normal phasing of weapon systems or demilitarization and disposal.  Some categories 
were underrepresented, such as Electronic Equipment and UAVs, and would require 
further study into the great diversity of these systems.  The Space Systems category was 
not represented at all.  Other categories, such as Ships, could be reviewed to determine 
the significance of certain factors of shipbuilding, including the type of ship or 
submarine, and how they affect O&S costs.  Army systems were not considered due to 
data deficiencies or the omission of pertinent data for weapon systems.  Systems that 
have been through their entire life cycle were not reviewed due to a lack of timely data, 
such as missing, incomplete, or unavailable actual O&S costs, though these retired 
systems would provide a valuable trove of information on sustainment. 
Increasing life expectancies, the true impact of acquisition strategy (new system, 
variation, retrofit, etc.) on O&S costs, the reality that estimates of O&S costs during the 
acquisition phase do not consider certain real events (war time, program life extensions, 
aging fleet costs) – these issues need to be explored with more fervor to provide for a 
more complete analysis of current and future costs, as well as set the stage for a more 
reasonable and realistic picture of what to expect for future systems.   
Some of our results showed that new development efforts may devote more 
resources (proportionally) to the acquisition of the system than to its sustainment.  
Conversely, variant or modification programs, such as the SSGN and the MH-60R/S, 
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show how leveraging the work of past development efforts can reduce the relative cost of 
acquisition for future capabilities.  For each category of weapon system, future work 
could be performed in determining how much the acquisition strategy affects the life-
cycle proportions.   
Summary 
To reduce the life-cycle costs of all DoD weapon systems down to a single ratio is 
impractical and imprudent.  Although the average percentage of O&S costs observed in 
this thesis was around 50-55% of LCC, the significant deviations from this percentage, 
both from individual weapon systems and categories of systems, that was demonstrated 
in this analysis illustrate the need to accept the differences among weapon system 
categories.  The differences within certain categories or sub-categories, such as Ships and 
Submarines, illustrate the need to further distill these groups into more meaningful and 
homogeneous types of systems before assigning a “typical” O&S/Acquisition cost ratio. 
In order to understand its costs, the DoD must also understand the other forces at 
play.  Life expectancies of systems and individual units, both estimated and realized, are 
increasing as more durable materials and sustainment methods are developed.  This can 
have a profound impact on not only the costs to sustain these systems, but also the 
decisions on how the DoD will acquire new capabilities.  Service life extension and 
capability upgrade programs have the potential of reducing the acquisition costs to fill 
identified capability gaps, allowing for better use of public funds. 
In order to make informed decisions regarding our nation’s arsenal, leaders and 
portfolio managers need to have the right information at the right time.  The Department 
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of Defense has begun to accumulate valuable information into its sustainment costs 
through systems like AFTOC, VAMOSC, and OSMIS.  Now this historical information 
needs to be reaped and processed to obtain the valuable insight it contains into the future 
of DoD systems.  We have a wealth of study into the acquisition of weapons.  Now is the 
time to better understand the inner workings and characteristics of the other side of the 
life of a DoD weapon system.  
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